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This Article confronts a paradox. Choice of law' seems to have everything yet almost
nothing to do with the United States Constitution. The Full Faith and Credit, Due
Process, Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Commerce Clauses all can
easily be read to protect nonforum state interests, or the interest of nonforum litigants,
that are disrupted by parochial state conflicts decisions. Yet the Supreme Court rarely
intervenes under the Constitution to protect these interests. For choice of law, ours is a
forgiving Constitution.
The forgiving Constitution permits what is here termed "conflicts localism": state and
federal diversity cases favoring local substantive law when the forum state's relation to
the controversy is clearly less than that of the place providing conflicting law. We see
that conflicts localism unfairly damages nonforum litigants, exhibits disrespect to
nonforum governments, and undermines principles of order and uniformity in choice of
law. This Article explains that the pernicious effects of conflicts localism are sufficiently
widespread to warrant a search for some kind of cure, and why, despite many different
avenues to law reform that are available in theory, nothing in fact stands in the way of
conflicts localism except the Constitution.
Deeper examination of the matter reenforces this conclusion. It is striking to observe
how themes appearing in the four strains of contemporary conflicts
theory-substantivism, multilateralism, unilateralism, and party expectations-recur
clearly in various parts of the Constitution. This Article demonstrates that, because policy
inspirations for constitutional doctrine regulating conflicts are so close to those for
conflicts doctrine itself, and because the Supremacy Clause grants the Supreme Court
clear entry to enforce those policies as constitutional doctrine, the authority of the Court
to monitor or rewrite conflicts law is unlimited. We see that the refusal of the Supreme
Court to use that authority to improve the quality of conflicts justice can be defended, if
at all, only as an exercise of enlightened forbearance.
Does the Supreme Court belong on the sidelines? Perhaps, the Article suggests. This
answer derives from the paradox itself. The Supreme Court may have been wise to forgo
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1. The terms "choice of law," "conflict of laws," and "conflicts law" appear interchangeably in this Article. They
describe law attempting
to provide an intelligible and principled basis for choosing a substantive rule (perhaps tort or contract)
over the competing rule of another place. Rules compete when their application would lead to conflicting
results and when the relation of each place to the controversy is such that it is plausible for the rule of
either place to govern. Conflicts law must legitimate the choice. It must explain why rejection of one law
in favor of another is right.
Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law-State or Federal?, 68 IND. LJ. 907, 907 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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a strong reaction to conflicts localism precisely because its constitutional authority over
choice of law is unbounded. Constitutional justifications for Supreme Court intervention
so fully partake of the mainstream values of choice of law that, should the Court begin
to give serious weight to the former, it would find no logical stopping point short of
constitutionalizing the entire subject. The Article confirms this idea through examination
of different constitutional rules for addressing conflicts localism. It then concludes that
it may be impossible for extensive constitutional and nonconstitutional components to
coexist in a stable regime of American conflicts law.
I. THE PARADOX
A. Conflicts Localism
In 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Blarney v. Brown2 and Hague v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,3 two conflicts cases that would eventually come to the attention of the
United States Supreme Court. The state court seemed in each case to go out of its way to
award a local litigant the benefits of Minnesota law.
In Blarney, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied a Wisconsin tavern proprietor
protection from dram shop liability available under Wisconsin law, although his conduct
occurred in Wisconsin. Conceding that the proprietor might have failed to obtain liquor
liability insurance upon the reasonable expectation that Wisconsin law would determine
tort exposure from his tavern business, the Minnesota Supreme Court chose instead
Minnesota dram shop law casting the defendant in liability. Its reasons for doing so were
that the plaintiff in need of compensation was a Minnesotan, and that it regarded
Minnesota law as more enlightened than Wisconsin law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court championed its own law again in Hague. Plaintiff
wished to aggregate (stack) coverage on three vehicles insured by her husband at the time
he died in a traffic accident. Wisconsin law did not permit stacking, however, Minnesota
law did.4 Plaintiff therefore stood to recover three times as much under the insurance
policy if Minnesota law, rather than Wisconsin law, applied. The court refused to apply
Wisconsin law, notwithstanding the facts that the plaintiff and her husband lived in
Wisconsin at the time of the accident, that the policy was contracted for and issued to
plaintiff's husband in Wisconsin, that all of the insured vehicles were garaged in
Wisconsin, and that the fatal accident occurred there.5 The principal reasons why the
court chose Minnesota law instead were reminiscent of those it offered for choosing
Minnesota law in Blarney.6 The court stressed that the plaintiff had become a Minnesotan
2.270 N.W.2d 884 (Miinn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980).
3.289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), aftd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hague
sparked a great deal of commentary. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law: A Dismal Prospect, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 907 (1981); P. John Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening
of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 889 (1981); Courtland H. Peterson, Proposals of Marriage
Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869 (1981); Gene R. Shreve, ln Search of Choice-of-Law
Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L REV. 327 (1982); Symposium, Choice-
of-Law TheoryAfter Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HoFsrRAL. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter HOFSrRA SYMIOSIUM].




CHOICE OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
prior to filing her case, and that Minnesota's stacking law was more just than Wisconsin's
antistacking law.
7
The unmistakable local bias of Blarney" and Hague9 is discernible in other-choice-of-
law decisions in American courts. Observers have noted this conflicts localism and the
possibilities of injustice and confusion that attend it.'" Moreover, local bias in choice of
law has not been limited to state cases. Federal diversity courts are obliged under the Erie
doctrine to follow the conflicts decisions of the states where they are sitting." Erie thus
denies federal judges authority to distance themselves from the most biased of state
conflicts decisions.
Federal diversity judges actually seem to share much of the enthusiasm of their state
colleagues for vindicating local state interests. Thus, in the well-known case of Rosenthal
v. Warren,'" a federal diversity court was inspired by the conflicts localism of New York
state decisions to press the interests of a New York plaintiff in a case having little
connection with New York. 3 Moreover, interaction of the Erie doctrine and the federal




8. Professor John Kozyris described Blarney as an "egregious" instance of "Minnesota state court overreaching."
Kozyris, supra note 3, at 905.
9. Professor Linda Silberman described Hague as "state parochialism in the choice-of-law process." Linda
Silbennan, Can the State ofMinnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 103 (1981). The case was to Professor Aaron Twerski "unrestrained state
chauvinism." Aaron D. Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of Law, 10
HOFsTRA L. REV. 149,151 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional
Choice of Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REv. 1063, 1063-64
(1979); Michael E. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Casefor Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J.
1 (1991); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict ofLaws, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES 411,428-29
(David S. Clark & Tugrul Ansay eds., 1992); James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Wony About Pull Faith and Credit
to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1987); William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or
Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REv. 645 (1983); Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice ofLaw Theory, 142
U.PA.L. REV. 949 (1994); cf Dirk H. Bliesener, Fairness and Choice of Law: A Critique of the Political Rights-Based
Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 687, 687 (1994) ("[Olne is not particularly hard put to run into a
choice-of-law case which seems rather unfairly decided.").
11. The requirement that federal diversity judges follow state conflicts law comes from two cases: Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Klaxon ended brief uncertainty about whether federal conflicts doctrine was still available to federal
courts sitting in diversity or was part of the federal general common law that Erie invalidated. Ruling it
to be the latter... Klaxon held that the plaintiff should not be iermitted to use federal diversity
jurisdiction to obtain a more favorable conflicts law.
GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANsEN, UNDERSTANDING CIvIL PROCEDURE § 41 [B] (2d ed. 1994).
12.475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
13. Rosenthal was a wrongful death case in which the plaintiff's decedent had elected to go to a Massachusetts
hospital for surgery and died there. Massachusetts wrongful death law would have limited the liability of the Massachusetts
defendants, the hospital and the surgeon. The Second Circuit instead subjected the defendants to unlimited liability for
wrongful death created under New York law. Apart from the New York citizenship of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's
decedent, all connections in the case were with Massachusetts. The court's choice of New York law has been widely
criticized. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFuCT OF LAWS 98-99 (2d ed. 1992); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr.,
The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 135-36 (1976); James
A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 225-27 (1976); Willis L.M. Reese,
Legislatire Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1605-06 (1978); cf RUSSELL J. WEIMTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CoNFLICT OF LAWs 340 (3d ed. 1986) (identifying Rosenthal as one of several decisions "that raise the question of
whether the plaintiff's state has sufficient nexus with the defendant or with the defendant's course of conduct to make it
fair and reasonable to hold the defendant liable under the plaintiff-favoring rule of the plaintiff's state').
14. Since federal diversity jurisdiction merely replicates state court jurisdiction for cases meeting the requirements
of28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), it may seem difficult at first to imagine how diversity jurisdiction could create possibilities
for conflicts localism greater than those existing for the parties had they chosen to litigate the same case in state court. Yet
this possibility exists because the Supreme Court reads the federal transfer-of-venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988),
1996]
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How much of a cause for concern is conflicts localism? The answer to this question
depends upon what we believe the choice-of-law process in American courts should
accomplish. If we believe that results in conflicts cases should be rational, predictable,
and fair; if we believe that the sovereign interests accounting for forum and nonforum law
alike should be respected whenever possible; and if we believe that all jurisdictions
within our system of state and federal courts should strive for uniformity in choice of law
in order to promote harmony between jurisdictions and discourage forum shopping; then
it is possible to understand the destructive effects of conflicts localism.'5
B. The Paradox of a Forgiving Constitution
The consequences of conflicts localism are, or at least could be, matters of concern
under our Constitution.'" Aggressive but plausible readings of numerous clauses could
bring the Constitution to bear. Consider some examples. The Due Process Clause could
protect litigants' reasonable expectations in choice of law." The Full Faith and Credit
Clause 9 could prevent unwarranted refusals to apply sister-state law.2 The separate or
combined effects of the Privileges and Immunities,2' Equal Protection,2 2 and CommerceP
Clauses could be to secure nonresident litigants from discriminatory applications of
and the Erie/Klaxon doctrine to require application of the state conflicts law of the transferor (original) forum instead of
that of the transferee forum. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). This is true even when the plaintiff seeks transfer
rather than the defendant. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). Diversity plaintiffs may shop for favorable state
conflicts law, as Ferens did, by filing in one federal district, then quickly securing a § 1404(a) transfer to a federal district
located in a different state.
The same stratagem is unavailable for plaintiffs who file in state rather than federal diversity courts. A state court lacks
authority to transfer one of its cases onto the docket ofa sister-state court. Instead, the equivalent to transfer ofvenue for
two state courts is for the initial case to be voluntarily dismissed or dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, and for
the plaintiffthen to start afresh in the court of the second state. The latter state court naturally applies its own conflicts law,
producing a result opposite to that for federal diversity litigation under the Ferens rule. Writing for four dissenting Justices
in Ferens, Justice Scalia doubted "that Congress meant to provide the plaintiffwith a vehicle by which to appropriate the
law of a distant and inconvenient forum in which he does not intend to litigate, and to carry that prize back to the State
in which he wishes to try the case." Ferens, 494 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For a more
extended explanation of these matters, see SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 1I, § 41[C].
15. These expectations provide many of the policies for conflicts theory.
Policies guiding modem theory embrace the same core concerns that exerted an unacknowledged
influence under old theory, which always should have mattered-that we should consider the purpose
and intended reach of rules vying for application; try to avoid choices that unfairly surprise a litigant; and
be sensitive to the needs of interstate federalism and international cooperation.
Shreve, supra note 1, at 912.
16. For discussion of the effect of the constitutions of other countries on their conflicts law, see Peter E. Herzog,
Constitutional Litnits on Choice of Law, 234 R.C.A.D.I. 239, 294-325 (1992).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Commentary on possibilities for due-process-based conflicts regulation is extensive. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY,
spra note 13, at 93-103; WamADUB, supm note 13, at 512-40; Kirgis, supra note 13; Kozyris, supra note 3; Robert A.
Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS. 706 (1963); Reese, supra note 13;
Shreve, supra note 3.
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
20. Again, the literature is extensive. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946); Peter Hay, Full Faith ad Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34 MERCER L. REV. 709
(1983); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945);
Martin, supra note 13, at 186-201; Pielemeier, supra note 10.
21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
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forum state law, thereby promoting uniformity in choice of law and discouraging forum
shopping. 24
Yet almost all of the Constitution's potential for averting the bad effects of conflicts
localism is unrealized under current law. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses exert no more than a slight influence on conflicts decisions. 25 The Supreme Court
appears to have given no role at all in conflicts to the Privileges and Immunities, 26 Equal
Protection,27 and Commerce Clauses."' It is symptomatic of this state of affairs that, while
the frustrated nonresident defendants in Rosenthal, Hague, and Blarney all petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for review, the Court granted certiorari only in Hague-and
there it affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of its own law.
29
The problem is not new. Fifty years ago, Justice Robert Jackson wrote: "I think it
difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more completely demonstrated or
more candidly confessed the lack of guiding standards of a legal character than in trying
to determine what choice of law is required by the Constitution."'3 Much later, Professors
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman wrote that the Supreme Court's affirmance in
Hague was "fair warning to the profession that the Court continues to have little to
contribute to the subject of constitutional control of choice of law."3' Recently, Professor
Friedrich Juenger delivered the verdict that "all attempts to induce the U.S. Supreme
Court to impose limits on state court experimentation" in choice of law "have come to
naught.""
2
We have now reached a series of conclusions upon which the paradox of choice of law
and the forgiving Constitution rests: (1) State and lower federal courts can and do render
24. See Brainerd Currie & Herma H. Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (1960); Brainerd Currie & Henna H. Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE LJ. 1323 (1960); John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
I:terest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Gottesman, supra note 10; Harold D. Horowitz, The
Conmerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice of Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1971); P. John Kozyris, Some
Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers-Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (1989); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); Peter D. Isakoff, Note, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in Choice of Law, 77 COLUM.L. REV. 272 (1977).
25. This is a recurring realization in literature on choice of law and the Constitution. BRANERD CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS ONTHE CONFUCr OFLAWS (1963); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law Rules v. Analysis: A More Workable Marriage
than the (Secont) Restatement; A Very Well Curried Leflar Over Reese Approach, 40 MERCERL. REV. 869 (1989); Robert
A. Sedle, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 59 (1981); David E. Seidelson, I (Wortman) + I (Ferens) = 6 (Years): That Can't Be Right-Can It? Statutes of
Limitations and Supreme Court Inconsistency, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 787 (1991); Gene R. Shreve, Interest Analysis as
Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 51 (1987); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law andMinimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Cmn. L.
REV. 440 (1982). For further discussion of the current minimal standard, see infra note 139.
26. "The Privileges and Immunities Clause has seen little use outside the area of state restrictions on access to natural
resources and other state benefits (and it has never been employed by the Supreme Court in a choice-of-law case)."
WILLAMM. RacAAN & WIuIAML. REYNOLDS, UNDERSrTANDINGCONFLIcr OF LAWS § 96[b] (2d ed. 1993); see also
Herzog, supra note 16, at 288-89.
27. "[Tlhe Equal Protection Clause has never been the basis of a Supreme Court choice-of-law decision ... 
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 96; see also Herzog, supra note 16, at 285-86.
28. "Although the Commerce Clause has significant potential implications for choice of law, the Supreme Court has
never used it to decide a case in that area." RICM4AN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 96; see also Herzog, supra note 16,
at 289.
29. Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289
N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), af'd, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1070 (1980).
30. Jackson, supra note 20, at 16.
31. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on
Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 35, 35 (1981).
32. Juenger, supra note 10, at 427.
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conflicts decisions biased against nonforum litigants and nonforum law; (2) These
decisions unfairly damage nonforum litigants, exhibit disrespect to nonforum
governments, and undermine principles of order and uniformity in choice of law; (3) The
authority of the Supreme Court to avert these consequences seems clear under several
clauses of the Constitution; (4) Yet the Supreme Court has denied the Constitution (and
thus itself) a significant role in choice of law.
II. How NECESSARY IS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM?
These conclusions might seem to warrant immediate and more precise inquiry
concerning the capacity of the Constitution to regulate choice of law. If our best
understanding of the problem turns out to be that conflicts localism violates the
Constitution, then, one could argue, the Supreme Court cannot refrain from announcing
and acting upon that fact.
Professor Douglas Laycock seems to advocate this view, urging prompt creation of a
legal regime where "[c]hoice-of-law methods that prefer local litigants, local law, or
better law are unconstitutional."33 Yet, even were we to assume that Laycock's approach
or some other34 is preferable in theory to current law, that alone would provide an
incomplete case against the Supreme Court inaction. Given the claim of so many other
matters for the Court's attention, it is not enough merely to demonstrate that a different
constitutional theory for conflicts would be more attractive than current law. There must
also be a strong practical need for Supreme Court intervention.
To determine whether conflicts is a topic worth the Supreme Court's time, we must ask
two questions. First, is conflicts localism (with its pernicious effects of injustice and
uncertainty)35 sufficiently widespread to warrant a search for some kind of cure? Second,
assuming conflicts localism does present a serious problem, is a solution other than
reformation of constitutional reviewing standards readily at hand? The following
discussion indicates that the answers to these successive questions are yes and no.
It is possible to argue that cases like Blarney, Hague, and Rosenthal inform more about
the notoriety than the extent of conflicts localism. 6 Certainly, decisions can be found
where judges refrained from favoring local litigants with forum law, even when a
plausible ground for doing so existed." Are decisions evincing principled self-denial as
33. See Laycock, supra note 24, at 336.
34. For a variety of ideas about increased constitutional control of choice of law, see James Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980); Willis L.M. Reese, The "Hague" Case: An Opportunity
Lost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 195 (1981); Gary J. Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A SuggestedApproach, 52 S.
CAL. L. REv. 61 (1978); Twerski, supra note 9.
35. This Article uses conflicts localism in a narrow sense, to describe a group of cases (Blarney, Hague, and
Rosenthal among them) where the forum chooses its own law, although the forum's relation to the controversy is clearly
less than that of the place providing the conflicting law. In a different, broader sense, conflicts localism might be said to
occur whenever the local residence of a litigant, or the local origin of chosen law, or both, figure in the result.
36. Professor Willis Reese, a critic of conflicts localism, see Reese, supra note 13, nonetheless questioned the extent
of the problem.
American choice of law is not as unruly and chaotic as is generally supposed. On the basis of the actual
court decisions, it appears that there is a fair measure of predictability and uniformity of result in all areas,
except torts, contracts in situations where the contract does not contain a choice-of-law clause, and
conveyances of interests in movables as between the parties to the conveyance.
Willis L.M. Reese, American Choice of Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 146 (1982).
37. Louise Weinberg, Against Cornity, 80 GEO. LJ. 53, 59 (1991). For a description of several such cases, see
Russell IJ. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products
Liability, 46 OHIo ST. LJ. 493,499-501 (1985). The Minnesota Supreme Court (that decided Blarney and Hague) recently
engaged in its own act of self-denial. Jepson v. General Casualty Co., 513 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 1994). For an analysis of
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indicative of conflicts decisionmaking in the United States as the notorious cases?
Apparently not. Empirical studies suggest a high incidence of chosen law favoring the
home-state litigant, especially when that litigant is the plaintiff." It may be impossible
to confirm beyond question that local bias is widespread in choice of law. Yet it takes
considerable force of will to doubt that fact, and to believe instead that local judges
would consistently read nonforum law as broadly and sympathetically as they would their
own local law.39
The conclusion that conflicts localism warrants a cure does not, however, bring us at
once to the Constitution. Nonconstitutional solutions are possible through state common
law, state statutes, federal common law, federal statutes, or self-executing treaties of the
United States.
Through the combined effect of our separation-of-powers tradition and the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution,4" the most authoritative nonconstitutional sources for
regulating choice of law are in theory federal statutes4 and self-executing treaties.42 Yet
very few conflicts cases are affected by law at this level,43 and, while the impact on
choice of law of federal statutes44 and treaties45 may increase in the fiture, there is no
reason to believe that the picture will soon change dramatically.
Jepson, see James R. Pielemeier, Some Hopefor Choice of Law in Minnesota, 18 HAMiULNE L. REV. 8 (1994).
38. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. IL LEE L. REV. 357, 382
(1992) ("[L]ifelong observers of American choice-of-law decisions may be able to detect that most recent cases can be
explained by a desire to apply pro-recovery, forum rles....'); cf Michael E. Solomine, An Economic and Empirical
Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 56 (1989) (noting the tendency under modem conflicts decisions that "a
forum state resolves a true conflict by using its own law, which inevitably favors the forum-shopping plaintiff'). Conflicts
localism also seems to be a problem in countries that share with the United States a decentralized, federal form of
government. Peter Nygh, Choice-of-Law Rules and Forum Shopping in Australia, 46 S.C. L. REv. 899, 912 (1995); John
Swan, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws: The Curious Position of the Supreme Court of Canada, 46 S.C. L. REv. 923,
931 (1995).
39. The idea that local judges are apt to give a broader reading to local law similarly explains why state judges are
more likely than federal judges to prefer state over federal law. For discussion of that phenomenon, see Gene R. Shreve,
Pragmatism Without Politics-A Half Measure ofAuthorityfor Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 767,
784-85.
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
41. The interstate or international character of conflicts cases places them clearly within the regulatory power of
Congress. CURRIE, supra note 25, at 125; Gottesman, supra note 10, at 1; Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional
Limitations on State Choice of Law: Due Process, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 851, 917-18 (1982).
42. Self-executing treaties take effect without ratification by Congress. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
CONSTrtMONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 6.6 (2d ed. 1992). "Whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-
executing depends on the intentions of the United States in signing and ratifying the treaty." GARY B. BORN & DAvID
WEsnN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTs 10-11 (2d ed. 1992).
43. The best known federal legislative example may be the conflicts rule in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1988), discussed in James A. Shapiro, Choice of Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Richards andRenvoi
Revisited, 70 N.C. L. REV. 641 (1992).
An example of choice of law by treaty may be found in Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention on the Law
Applicable to International Contracts, discussed in Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law
Merchant, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1995), and in Harold S. Burman, International Conflict of Laws, The 1994
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, and Trends for the 1990s, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 367 (1995). However, it is possible for the United States to sign a commercial treaty while (through a
reservation) refusing to accept the binding effect of a choice-of-law provision in the treaty. This occurred in connection
with the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY,
UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 11 (1995).
44. There has been some interest in and out of Congress in statutory reform in choice of law for mass torts litigation.
See AmCAN LAW INSrTiurn COMPLEX LITGATION: STAUrORY REcOMMNmDAiONs AN ANALYSIS § 6.01 (1994);
James A.R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L.
REV. 1001,1012-13 (1994). So far, initiatives have fallen short. For a description of the obstacles faced in Congress, see
Charles G. Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. LroG. 401 (1991).
45. Professor Juenger sees a greater role in the future for choice of law by treaty. Juenger, supra note 43, at 495-96.
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The lack of a congressional initiative leaves the way clear for the federal courts to
reform state conflicts law by displacing it with a federal common law of conflicts. The
Supreme Court could occupy part of the conflicts field with federal common law, either
by overruling Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.," its decision extending the
Erie doctrine to conflicts questions,47 or by nationalizing choice of law for a particular
category of litigation.4 Alternatively, the Supreme Court could nationalize the entire
subject of conflict of laws.
Freeing federal diversity judges from the constraints of state conflicts law might avoid
embarrassments like the Rosenthal case and the incongruities of federal choice of law
following transfer of venue,49 and it might return to nonresident suitors a measure of
protection from local bias that diversity jurisdiction was created to secure.5" At the same
time, the proposition that federal diversity jurisdiction alone provides authority for a
federal common law of conflicts is not free from doubt." Moreover, it would be difficult
to overrule Klaxon without unraveling much of the Erie doctrine.52 For these reasons, and
because the Supreme Court has not exhibited the slightest inclination to overrule
Klaxon,"3 it is doubtful that the choice-of-law picture will change for federal diversity
judges.
It is ironic that, in contrast to uncertainties attending the more modest objective of
overruling Klaxon, the authority of the federal judiciary to make conflicts law binding
throughout the country is secure through the Supremacy Clause.54 Most agree that the
federal courts may borrow the authority to regulate choice of law that lies dormant in
Congress.55 Thus, while overruling Klaxon would merely create a federal common law
of conflicts applicable in federal diversity cases, the same doctrine made through use of
46.313 U.S. 487 (1941).
47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
48. For example, the Supreme Court could formulate national choice-of-law rules for mass torts, a prospect
entertained in Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 109; Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Mu ltiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7,
38-39 (1986).
49. See the discussion of the Ferens case, supra note 14. Ferens has been widely criticized. See, e.g., George D.
Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn 't a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV.
649,655 (1993); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990,24 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 735, 781 n.166 (1991); Ursula M. Henninger, Note, The
Plaintif's Fonmi Shopping Gold Card Choice of Law in Federal Courts After Transfer of Venue Under Section 1404(a),
26 WAKE FORESx L. REV. 809 (1991).
50. On the purpose of diversity jurisdiction to diminish the significance of citizenship in the outcome of cases, see
HENRY L FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURisDIcTiON: A GENERAL VIEw (1973); Patrick J. Borchers, Conference on Jurisdiction,
Justice. and Choice ofLawfor the Twenty-First Century-Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV.
517, 533 (1995) (mock appellate opinion); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey anda Proposal,
91 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1977). As a result, "[c]onflicts rules arejust the sort of subject for which uniform treatment across
all federal courts makes sense." Borehers, supra, at 533.
51. See David E. Seidelson, Section 6.01 of the ALI's Complex Litigation Project: Function Follows Form, 54 LA.
L. REV. 1111, 1112 n.2 (1994); Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REV.
1141, 1149-50 (1994).
52. The core principle of the Erie doctrine is that a litigant may not use federal diversity jurisdiction to obtain a
different result than would have been possible in the state courts of the forum. SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note
11, § 39, at 167. Klason prevents the choice of substantive law different than that which would have been chosen in a state
case, therefore, it secures the Erie principle in conflicts settings.
53. Klason was reaffirmed in Day & Zimmermann v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
54. See Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 806 (1971); Silberman, supra note 9, at 131; Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law
a,,d Federal Common Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1977).
55. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 54. The sources of authority for a federal common law of conflicts are listed
in Shreve, supra note 3, at 338 n.55.
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dormant congressional power would be enforceable through the Supremacy Clause in all
federal and state conflicts cases.
Serious questions remain, however, concerning the wisdom or likelihood of a national
common law of conflicts. Federal judges are usually reluctant to make common law.16
That reluctance extends to the subject of choice of law, and it is easy to understand why.
Conflicts is a historically difficult and controversial legal subject; 7 hence, the prospect
of announcing, refining, and administering federal conflicts law does not attract most
federal judges. They are not inclined to wrest conflicts lawmaking authority from state
judges even for a limited and pressing subject like mass tort litigation." The federal
judiciary is even more disinclined to nationalize conflicts law entirely. Thus, while the
Justices have not spelled out their reasons for the view, there may be unanimous
agreement on the Supreme Court that conflicts should not become a domain of federal
law.
59
56. On this general condition and its causes, see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Jackson, supra note 20, at 1; cf Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881., 885 (1986) (describing federal common law as typically the exception rather than
the rule). Supreme Court development of federal common law has been guarded to say the least. The Supreme Court itself
has stated that occasions for federal common law are "few and restricted"E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304 (1981).
57. See BENJA.mN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928) (regarding conflicts to be "one of
the most baffling subjects of legal science"); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 1 (1993)
("Alas, in spite ofall the valiant intellectual efforts lavished on it, and the voluminous literature that has built up over the
ages, the law of conflicts remains mired in mystery and confusion."); Max Rleinstein, Book Note, How to Review a
Festschnfi, 11 AM. J. COlm. L. 632, 655 (1962) (finding conflicts the "most difficult and most confused of all branches
of the law") (reviewing David F. Cavers, Re-Restating the. Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349-64 (A.W. Sythoff-Leyden ed., 1961)).
On reasons for the particular difficulty of conflicts, see Gene R. Shreve, Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1672 (1992); Arthur T. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAw & CONTEMI'.
PROBS. 27 (1977). In short:
Those who work in the field of choice of law are, at times, discouraged by the apparently intractable
nature of the problems with which they must grapple. Intricate and subtle analyses are undertaken;
ambiguities and uncertainties are painfully resolved; [u]ltimately, a result is reached, yet the solution is
too frequently neither entirely satisfying nor fully convincing.
von Mehren, supra, at 31. But see Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24
CORNELL IT'L LU. 245, 247 (1991) (questioning whether conflicts issues are distinctly different from or more difficult
than other issues in civil procedure); Sterk, supra note 10, at 951-52 (questioning the importance of conflicts theory).
58. On the absence of a federal common law of conflicts in mass tort litigation, see Juenger, supra note 48; Rowe
& Sibley, supra note 48; Shreve, supra note 1, at 917; cf In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987
(2d Cir. 1980) (refusing tormake common law to determine liability for mass toxic exposure of personnel in Vietnam
because, while concerns of national policy existed in the case, the court did not feel itself best suited to determine how
those policies should be balanced).
59. Should the Supreme Court convert all conflicts law into federal common law, it would soon encounter a serious
problem. "Ifthe Supreme Court imposed a neutral ... choice-of-law methodology.., it would face the dilemma of either
undertaking a debilitating amount of'superintendence through judicial review of state decisions or presiding over only the
illusion ofneutrality in the choice-of-law process." Shreve, supra note 3, at 344.
This realization may account for the hostile reception the Justices have given to the idea of nationalizing conflicts law.
Writing for the plurality in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981), Justice Brennan refused to indicate
"whether we would make the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the Minnesota Supreme Court." Justice Stevens
added in his concurrence: "It is not this Court's function to establish and impose upon state courts a federal choice-of-law
rule:'Id at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), the Court stated: "We
make no effort to determine for ourselves which law must apply to the various transactions involved in this lawsuit, and
we reaffirm our observation in Allstate that in many situations a state court may be free to apply one of several choices
of law." Id at 823; C Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,729 (1988) ("It is not the function of this Court... to make
departures from established choice-of-law precedent and practice constitutionally mandatory.).
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In the absence of federal conflicts law, state legislatures have authority to remedy
conflicts localism.60 Yet they are not a group likely to be offended by local bias in choice
of law. In fact, with a few exceptions, state legislatures seem disinterested in the subject
of conflict of laws. 6'
At the bottom of the chain of legal institutions capable of making conflicts law rests
the state judiciary. Their power and obligation to make conflicts law exists by default.6'
However, state judges appear likely for the foreseeable future to be the only lawmakers
regularly on the scene, hence the only realistic source of nonconstitutional reform in
choice of-law. That is cold comfort to the opponents of conflicts localism. There is no
reason to believe that state courts, who bear the greatest responsibility for conflicts
localism, will suddenly be moved to eliminate it.
The problem may be averted without increased choice-of-law review under the
Constitution if legal developments outside the conflicts field incidentally eliminate
opportunities for conflicts localism. There are two possibilities. First, the Supreme Court
could significantly increase due process constraints on the personal jurisdiction of state
and lower federal courts. Thus, if the Court required for personal jurisdiction a tighter
relationship than exists currently between the forum and the controversy,' the cases that
now most clearly evince forum bias in choice of law might never reach the merits."
Second, the creation of new federal substantive law would preempt the application of
state law, and hence, opportunities for conflicts localism. Given the Supremacy Clause,
local state law-or, for that matter, any state law conflicting with the federal law-would
cease to be a legitimate choice-of-laW option.65
Neither of these possibilities, however, seems likely. The Supreme Court has evinced
little interest of late in redrawing the boundaries of personal jurisdiction. The last
important personal jurisdiction case actually supported state personal jurisdiction in a
60. They usually occupy positions above their state judiciaries through a separation-of-powers arrangement like that
for Congress and the federal judiciary. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRErATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 67
(1975); G. ALAN TARR & MARY CA. PORTER, STATE SUPREM COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 52-53 (1988). Thus, "[a]
court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(l) (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEmENr (SECOND)].
61. One commmentator states:
Several European countries (for example Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) have codified most or all
of their conflicts law.... In the United States the most comprehensive statutory approach to choice of
law is the Louisiana codification of 1992.... In most instances, however, statutory directions in the
United States with reference to choice of law are much more limited.
WILLIS L. M. REESE aT AL, CONFLICT OF LAWS-CAsEs AND MATERIALS 36 (Supp. 1995). For a detailed examination
of state statutory developments in choice of law that have occurred in this country, see the discussion and citations
appearing in Shreve, supra note 1, at 910. Overall, the amount of state statutory law remains small. The ALI's 1971
observation still stands: "A court will rarely find that a question of choice of law is explicitly covered by statute."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 6 cant. b.
62. "It scarcely adds to the lustre of conflicts law to realize that state courts contribute most of its content because
they alone cannot avoid the task." Shreve, supra note 1, at 911.
63. For discussion of the current requirements, see ROBERTC. CASAD, JURisDICION IN CIVIL AcIONS §§ 2.04-2.05
(2d ed. 1991); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 11, §§ 15-19, at 61-88; Symposium, Fifty Years ofInte mational
Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1995).
64. Although, even with tighter regulation of personal jurisdiction, some problematic conflicts cases might still slip
through that net. For examples, see Shrove, supra note 25, at 59-60. For discussion of the relation between personal
jurisdiction and choice of law generally, see Symposium, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. I (1988);
HOFsrRA SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3.
65. For more on this phenomenon, and how it differs from the standard, or "horizontal" choice-of-law problem, see
ARTHUR T. VON MENHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1038-41 (1965).
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place with little connection to the controversy.' Similarly, the possibility of introducing
federal substantive law in troubled choice-of-law areas seems unlikely to attract the
interest of either Congress67 or the federal courts.6"
We have seen, that while it is difficult to measure the precise extent of damage done
by conflicts localism, the problem appears serious. And we have seen, while
nonconstitutional possibilities for eliminating or reducing the problem exist in theory,
they depend on lawmaking initiatives that legal institutions have not taken and, in their
discretion, are unlikely to take. Nothing, then, stands in the way of conflicts localism
except the Constitution.
III. CONFLICTS THEORY CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION
Should the Constitution stand in the way of conflicts localism? This Article offers no
final answer to the question but will show that the matter is a good deal more complicated
than Professor Laycock's prescription69 would suggest. To thoroughly understand the
opportunities and limitations in constitutional theory for regulating choice of law, one
must first consider the character of conflicts law confronting the Constitution.
Conflicts law is usually common law,70 therefore, one can expect to find in judicial
opinions a good deal of conflicts theory and policy. As in any common law sphere,"
decisions creating or adjusting conflicts doctrine aspire to a measure of principled
elaboration: careful balancing of social interests and concern for reasoned delineation and
continuity in law.' Policies enlisted in conflicts opinions to meet the demands of
principled elaboration usually support one of three approaches. These are the substantive,
multilateral, and unilateral approaches to choice of law." In addition, courts and
commentators periodically express concern that chosen law not unreasonably disturb the
expectations of a party.
66. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). For discussion of this case, see Symposium, The Future of
Personal Jurisdiction: A Symposium on Bumham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 559 (1991).
67. For example, federal substantive law is "[t]he obvious and simplest solution" to conflicts problems posed in mass
torts cases. Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1731 (1992); see also
Gottesman, supra note 10, at 14; Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform andArticle 11I Jurisdiction, 59 FoRDHAM
L. REV. 169, 197 (1990). Yet the idea of Congress enacting such legislation is "utopian." Symeon C. Symeonides, The
ALL 's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National Debate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 855 (1994). The American
Law Institute expressed the same sentiment, explaining why it decided not to recommend federal substantive law for mass
tort litigation. "mhe possibilities of reaching a political consensus on what the appropriate federal standard should be,
as well as expecting Congress to intrude so directly into areas historically governed by state law, appear so slim that it
becomes important to look for... a procedural solution." AMERICAN LAW INslrrurE, supra note 44, § 6.
68. The negative reaction of the Second Circuit in the Agent Orange case, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), explained
supra note 58, is indicative.
69. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 61.
71. Judges lack the ad hoe authority of legislators. Instead, the judicial function requires a process of reasoned
elaboration. See M.P. Golding, Principled Decisionmaking and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35,40 (1963);
Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 982, 999 (1978); cf G. Edward
White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 285
(1973) ("[Judges are] required to make public the justifications for their decisions, thus inviting comment on their
performance.").
72. See generally Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CMo. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (1948);
James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in LegalReasoning, 29 UCLAL. REV. 833 (1982); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical
Reasoning andJudicialJustification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985); Kenneth I. Winston,
On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974).
73. See JuXTGER, supra note 57, at 45-46 ("These three approaches have coexisted since the Middle Ages.").
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A. The Substantive Approach
The single-minded policy of the substantive approach is that there is a preferable result
for a particular type of case (e.g., plaintiffs should win product liability cases). Conflicts
law should not obstruct this outcome. It should, if anything, facilitate it. The substantive
approach can take one of two forms. One makes the choice-of-law issue disappear. This
may happen because the sovereign making substantive law is so powerful that conflicting
law from an inferior source must give way. The relation of federal to state substantive law
is the most important example.74 Or a group of coequal sovereigns may all adopt the same
substantive rule as their local law.75 The other substantive approach, necessary when
coequal sovereigns have conflicting laws, is to authorize substantive preference within
the choice-of-law scheme. An example used by a number of courts is the fifth and last of
Professor Robert Leflar's "Choice-influencing Considerations," termed "Application of
the better rule of law." 76
Neither multilateralism nor unilateralism share with the substantive approach the
concern over the innate justice of chosen law. Both are concerned instead with selection
of the correct sovereign, or law source.77 These two conflicts approaches have coexisted
since medieval times. Our leading conflicts historian writes that this "is remarkable
because unilateralism and multilateralism proceed from different assumptions, focus on
different questions, and are bound to yield different conclusions. 7
B. Multilateralism
Multilateralism strives for uniform results in choice of law. To the multilateralist
judge, the possible sources of chosen law are sovereigns, or jurisdictions, that make up
a kind of legal community. Each type of case has its own conflicts rule, administrable
throughout that legal community. 9 For example, the requirement that the tort law of the
74. See supra notes 40-45, 54-55 and accompanying text.
75. This is the object of uniform law movements sponsored by groups like the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute.
76. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Inluencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 295-303 (1966).
For a survey of other substantive approaches to choosing law, see Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 ALB. L.
REV. 883, 900-02 (1993).
77. Juenger, supra note 43, at 489. "[B]oth postulate that transactions that cross territorial boundaries must be
governed by the laws laid down by a state or nation; neither countenances legal rules that are not rooted in some
sovereign's command." Id. at 490.
78. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419, 427 (1983). For other comparisons between
multilateralism and unilateralism in choice of law, see LEA BR5LMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-17 (2d ed. 1995);
Bliesener, supra note 10, at 704-07; Henna H. Kay, A Defense ofCurrie's Govenmuental Interest Analysis, 215 R.C.A.D.I.
9,92-94 (1989).
79. One can think of this approach as a choice of jurisdiction rather than choice-of-law approach. "T]he selecting
process can be--and is-viewed as providing the required choice of law." Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice
of Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 927, 931 (1975). The approach goes by a variety of names, including
territorialism, see JUENGER, supra note 57, at 90-9 1, and jurisdiction-selecting rules, see David F. Cavers, A Critique of
the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933). "The jurisdiction-selecting rule makes a state the object
of choice; in theory it is only after the rule has selected the governing state by reference to the 'contact' prescribed in the
rule that the court ascertains the content of the state's law." DAvID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 9 n.24
(1965) (emphasis in original).
Multilateralists were therefore concerned that rules be clear and simple enough to be uniformly administered throughout
the community ofjurisdictions. E.g., Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1909). This helps to explain the stem, simplistic, and categorical form multilateral conflict rules usually assumed. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CoNFLIcT OF LAWs (1934) [hereinafter ORIGINAL RESTATEiENT].
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place of injury should govern is a multilateral rule. 8 Ideally, each member of this
community ofjurisdictions would use the common conflicts rule, and uniform choice-of-
law results would exist in fact. If so, the high-minded suppositions of interjurisdictional
order and comity8 attending the earliest conceptions of multilateralism in this country
would be vindicated. To many multilateralists, however, that perfect or even substantial
interjurisdictional cooperation is unnecessary to justify their approach. They have
contended that multilateralism in any event advances policies of antidiscrimination. 82 And
many have used vested rights analysis to maintain that multilpteralism leads to the only
valid source of law.8 3
Multilateralism dominated choice of law in this country during the 19th century and
for the first half of the 20th century. Published in 1834, Joseph Story's strongly
multilateralist Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws was quite influential in the United
States and abroad. 4 No less committed to multilateralism, Professor Joseph Beale
extended the movement through his scholarship s and through his leadership in the
creation of the original Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, published one
hundred years after Story's treatise. Resistance materialized, however, to the
uncompromising multilateralism of Story and Beale. It may be found in commentary
beginning in the 1920's6 and in judicial decisions somewhat later.8 7
Shortly after mid-century, the choice-of-law revolution began in earnest.8 Particularly
in torts and contract cases, American jurisdictions began rejecting multilateralism in rapid
succession. Today, the original Restatement enjoys widespread acceptance in only a few
80. When injury was the last event in time making up the cause of action, the rule could also be stated as the place
of the wrong. Eg., ORIGNALRESTATMENT, supra note 79, § 378 ("The law of the place of wrong determines whether
a person has sustained a legal injury.").
81. Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws--One Hundred Years After, 48 HARv. L.
REV. 15,34-37 (1934). Some multilateralists had reservations early on. Beale's skepticism about the value of comity is
expressed in JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON TtE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1964-65 (1935); cf. Perry Dane, VestedRights.
"Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191 (1987) (discussing a multilateral approach disavowing comity).
82. Early multilateralists deplored the autonomy displayed by some courts who departed from territorial rules. E.g.,
Beale, supra note 79, at 2. Early multilateralists may have had some sense of antidiscrimination as a value. See
BRILMAYER, supra note 78, at 18 ("[M]ultilateralists ... by and large believed that their methods helped judges
successfully escape the gravitational pull of forum legal rules.").
Yet it is clear that antidiscrimination figures more prominently in the work of contemporary writers sympathetic to
multilateralism. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICiH. L. REV. 392 (1980);
John B. Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 651; Ely,
supra note 24; Kozyris, supra note 3; Twerski, supra note 9, at 162.
Modem multilateralists also exhibit greater willingness to see as victims of conflicts localism not only nonforum
sovereigns but also nonforum litigants, by discussing the problem in ways that seem to consider both concerns, and by
expressly identifying the concern of party fairness. E.g., Twerski, supra note 9, at 170.
83. The vested rights jurisprudence ofmultilateralists left them with the conviction that their conflicts rules produced
not merely the best result, but the only legitimate one. See, e.g., BEALE, supra note 81, at 1967-69. Vested rights theories
in choice of law are surveyed and reworked in Dane, supra note 81, at 1260-63.
84. On Story's conflicts writing and its influence, see JUENGER, supra note 57, at 88; ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY
AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1992); Lorenzen, supra note 81; Kurt A.
Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230 (1961).
85. See BEALE, supra note 81; Beale, supra note 79. For a discussion ofBeale and a comparison of his approach
with that of Story, see von Mehren, supra note 79, at 929-30, 943-45,
86. See WALTER W. COOK, Tim LOGICAL AND LEGALBASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1942); Cavers, supra note
79; Elliot E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945);
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE LJ. 736 (1924); Hessel E. Yntema,
The HornbookMethod and the Conflict ofLaws, 37 YALE LJ. 468 (1928).
87. !Eg., W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. 1945); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
88. For descriptions of this period, see David F. Cavers, Contenrporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131
R.C.A.D.I. 75 (1970); Harold L. Korn, The Choice ofLaw Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983).
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jurisdictions. 9 Multilateralism may assume new forms in the future and regain some of
its prior importance." For the time being, however, courts are most receptive to
multilateralism when the approach is softened9' and blended with unilateral, and at times
substantive, policies.92
C. Unilateralism
Unilateralism" shares with multilateralism the idea that choice of law should search
for the appropriate sovereign (law source) rather than for the best law. 4 Yet unilateralism
shares with the substantive approach a keen interest in the content of the laws vying for
application. A unilateralist would see no contradiction here. She does not examine each
of the conflicting laws to determine (as a substantivist would) which best promotes
justice. Rather, she examines them to determine whether each, upon closer study, is truly
applicable. A law is truly applicable to a unilateralist only if the case at hand is one of the
cases that the law was designed to govern.95 If so, then the sovereign creating that law
may be said to be interested in having it applied.96 Interest analysis is the linchpin for
conflicts unilateralism in the United States.
Unilateralists are not particularly opposed to the idea of uniformity in choice of law.
They simply do not share the multilateralist belief that uniformity is of central
importance. Unilateralists would maintain that, in at least some cases, interest analysis
leads to a different and better result than that provided by multilateralism. Consider an
example. Following the facts of a famous case,97 let us assume that passenger plaintiff and
driver defendant, both residents of State A, travel together to State B, where defendant
loses control of his car and negligently injures plaintiff. Assume further that the tort law
89. For a list of jurisdictions that continue to adhere to the original Restatement (and of the far greater number
rejecting it), see Borchers, supra note 38, at 370-72.
90. Various possibilities for the revival of multilateralism are examined in BRILMAYER, supra note 78, at 181-202;
Dane, supra note 81; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990); Robert A. Sedler, Interest
Analysis, Party Expectations andiudicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases: Reflections on Cooney v. Osgood Machinery,
59 BROOK. L. REv. 1323 (1994).
91. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, succeeded the original Restatement in 1971 and softened the
multilateralism of the latter. For example, commands in the original Restatement to apply law of the place of the wrong
(injury) in tort cases, ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 381, were reduced to presumptions in the second
Restatement. Thus according to the second Restatement, "In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where
the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless... some other state has a more significant
relationship... in which event the local law of the other state will be applied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60,
§ 146.
92. The second Restatement administers its "significant relationship" test, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
60, § 146, through a series of choice-of-law policies in § 6(2). These include the multilateralist subsections, § 6(2)(a) ("the
needs of the interstate and international systems") and § 6(2)(f) ("certainty, predictability and uniformity of result');
unilateralist subsections, § 6(2)(b) ("the relevant policies of the forum") and § 6(2)(c) ("the relevant policies of other
interested states"); and substantive subsections, § 6(2)(e) ("the basic policies underlying the particular field of law") and
§ 6(2)(g) ("ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied").
93. Unilateralism in choice of law has assumed a variety of forms over its long history. See P.M. NORTH & JJ.
FAWCEIT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAW 15-26 (12th ed. 1992); Juenger, supra note 43, at 489-
90; Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297 (1953). The explanation
of unilateralism in this Article describes the movement as it developed in this country during the 20th century.
94. To both, "all rules of decisions are suited equally to govern multistate cases." JUENGER, supra note 57, at 156.
95. Unilateralism is "Itlhe determination of the personal and territorial reach of the potentially applicable local rules
of decision." Id. at 45. "Mhe reach of substantive rules.., is the essence of unilateralism." Id. at 14.
96. Cf id. at 159 ("Unilateralists ... purport to obey sovereign commands by enforcing laws in accordance with the
respective lawmakers' wishes....").
97. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). For discussion of the case, see Symposium, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson. A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
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of the place of the plaintiffs and the defendant's residence makes defendant liable to
plaintiff, but the law of the place of injury does not.
The multilateral conflicts rule directs the court in this and other personal injury cases
to apply the rule of decision of the place of the injury, State B.9 If, however, the purpose
of State A's pro-recovery law was to compensate victims and the purpose of State B's
anti-recovery law was to keep insurance rates down in State B, only State A will be
interested in having its tort law applied. The policy of compensation accounting for the
existence of State A's pro-recovery law would be implicated because plaintiff is a citizen
of State A and could, in the absence of compensation, become a ward of State A. But the
cost-conscious policy accounting for State B's anti-recovery law would not be
implicated, because recovery by plaintiff would affect insurance rates of State A, rather
than those of State B. Through interest analysis, the unilateralist judge chooses the law
of State A, concluding that State A is the only sovereign genuinely interested in having
its law applied."
Much of the credit for launching unilateralism in this country goes to Brainerd Currie,
the principal creator of interest analysis." Professor Currie distinguished cases where
only one sovereign was interested in having its law applied (he termed them "false"
conflicts) from those where both sovereigns were interested ("true" conflicts). Not all of
Currie's unconventional ideas were successful. Some were either stillborn'0' or frayed
over time.0 2 His greatest accomplishment was to establish through his false conflict
98. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. This was the result in Babcock. For an illuminating study of the use of interest analysis in that case, see William
M. Riehman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understaniing ofInterest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST.LJ. 317, 318-20 (1982).
But see Alabama G.S.R.v. Carroll, II So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (providing a famous example of a multilateral solution to the
problem posed in Babcock).
100. See, e.g., Brainerd Cunie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE LJ. 171. Many
of Professor Currie's most important works appear in CURRIE, supra note 25. His ideas are discussed at length in
Symposium, Interest Analysis in Conflicts of Laws: An Inquiry into Fundamentals with a Side Glance at Products
Liability, 46 O1o ST. LJ. 457 (1985) [hereinafter OHIO STATE SYMPOSIUM].
Actually, the very first conflicts scholarship in this country was ofa unilateralist bent, in the European statutist tradition.
SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE
LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS (1828). Closer to Currie's own time, several authors anticipated something
of his interest-analysis approach. See supra note 86. For all that, Currie's special place in conflicts scholarship is secure.
See Ely, supra note 24, at 174 n.3 ("There were important precursors .... but Currie's was certainly a more complete
system of interest analysis: his work is among the most formidable corpora in all of legal theory.").
101. Curie's contention that the truly interested forum should always apply its own law never won judicial acceptance
as an express conflicts rule. See Ely, supra note 24, at 175 (concluding that the idea "has had almost no takers"); Gene
R. Shreve, Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis-Has It Become a Paper Tiger?, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 541, 542 (1985).
Professor Ely and some other critics believe that, even if interest analysts want to divorce themselves from Currie's
fonim-bias rule (and most do), it is impossible. Interest analysis, these critics maintain, is innately forum favoring, E.g.,
BRnMAYER, supra note 78, at 68; Bleisener, supra note 10, at 705 nA; Ely, supra note 24, at 175.
Many share the opposing view, however, that interest analysis does work (in fact, works better) when it confers no
special advantage to forum law or forum residents. The classic exposition of interest analysis as a neutral approach appears
in William F. Baxter, Choice of Law andthe Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1963). Belief in this possibility
is reflected in the juxtaposition of forum and nonfoum interest-probing criteria in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
60, § 6. The adoption of interest analysis by the Restatement (Second) reflects a serious commitment to the idea that
neutral interest analysis is not an oxymoron. "[Tlhe Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum which
has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law." Willis L.M. Reese, Conflict
of Laws andthe Restatement (Second), 28 LAW & CONEMP. PROBS. 679,692 (1963). In its recent proposals for complex
litigation, the American Law Institute reaffirmed its view on the utility of interest analysis in a neutral approach to choice
of law, presenting criteria "for purposes of identifying each state having a policy that would be furthered by the application
of its laws" and directing the means whereby "the court shall choose the applicable law from among the laws of the
interested states." ANMERCAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 44, § 6.01 (c)-(d).
102. Evidence of the purpose for a rule of decision, the grist for interest analysis, may be inconclusive or nonexistent.
See Lea Brilmayer, Govenmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 459 (1985); Aaron
D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism aidProfessor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1971).
And Currie's approach was generally less effective for true conflicts cases and for'no interest" cases. See JUENGER, supra
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principle a formidable argument for departing from multilateral choice of law. 3 Ten
years ago, Professor John Kozyris wrote that "interest analysis ... has dominated the
conflicts agenda for the last quarter century and deconstructed traditional conflicts in
most states."'' 4 At the same time, unilateralist policies of interest analysis are now most
likely to appear interspersed with those of multilateralism and substantivism.'0°
D. Party Expectations as to Chosen Law
Taken together, the three conflicts approaches just considered encompass most of the
cgnflicts policies in use today.'0 6 Yet the following important principle may be difficult
to locate within either a substantive, multilateralist, or unilateralist approach. A party
may be protected from the choice of unfavorable law if the party reasonably and to his
detriment relied on the application of favorable law. The policy justifying this-variously
termed party expectations, avoidance of unfair surprise, or foreseeability-is well
accepted in conflicts theory.1
7
The availability of this policy is likely to turn on idiosyncracies of fact, such as
whether a party actually relied on the application of favorable law, or whether that
reliance was reasonable. While courts often discount the expectations factor in tort
cases, 8 it can figure there. 9 The policy comes to bear more frequently in other areas,
like contract cases, "0 where the parties are more likely to have expectations about choice
of law prior to the controversy.
The expectations policy does not seem within the substantive tradition in choice of law
because it has little if anything to do with the innate quality of the law upon which a party
reasonably relies. Uniformity sought by multilateralism, if actually achieved, might
enhance foreseeability in choice of law and correspondingly reduce possibilities for
unfair surprise."' However, the multilateralist predilection for stern and categorical
conflicts rules"' is ill suited to administer a policy as supple and case variable as
note 57, at 159 (arguing that "[u]nilateralists ... are stymied if more than one sovereign 'wants' his law to control a given
case, or [if] none cares"). For elaboration of difficulties posed for interest analysis in no-interest cases, see Aaron D.
Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner. Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 104 (1973).
103. In one way or another, the great number of American jurisdictions that have abandoned the original Restatement
in torts cases, see supra note 89 and accompanying text, have all drawn from Currie's false conflicts principle.
104. P. John Kozyris, Foreword, 0010 STATE SYMPOStUM, supra note 100, at 457.
105. See the example provided by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 6 (discussed supra note 92).
106. "IThe venerable tenets of unilateralism, multilateralism, and the substantive law approach remain the basic
ingredients of our mysterious science." JUENGER, supra note 57, at 151.
107. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 6 cmt. g ("Generally speaking, it would be unfair and
improper to hold a person liable under the local law ofone state when he had justifiably molded his conduct to conform
to the requirements of another state.'); Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 959,969-72 (1952); Max Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TL.
L. REV. 4, 17-28 (1944).
108. It is unlikely that the alleged tort will come about through planning or arrangements by the parties. See Clark v.
Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966) ("Predictability of legal results in advance of the event is largely irrelevant, since
automobile accidents are not planned.').
109. Expectations issues in torts largely arise when the defendant argues that he relied reasonably on tort law favorable
to him when deciding how to behave, or when deciding how much insurance to obtain. Rheinstein, supra note 107, at 27.
An example would be the predicament of the defendant in the Blamey case. See supra part I.A. for discussion of Blamey.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 60, § 6 cmt. g; RICHIMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 85; Rheinstein,
supra note 107, at 21. The expectations factor in contract cases is subsumed, however, in the growing number of cases
governed by choice-of-law clauses incuded in the contract. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, § 72.
111. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 107, at 969-70.
112. See. e.g., ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 79.
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expectations. Unilateralism, while a method-centered and case-variable approach,'I3
shares classic multilateralism's focus on sovereigns as a source of law." 4 To
unilateralism, preoccupied with interest analysis," 5 concern about expectations of the
parties would be something of a distraction."
6
In the end, whether a policy protecting reasonable expectations exists within one of the
tripartite categories or separately may not be terribly important. We have already noted
that substantive, multilateral, and unilateral approaches have fragmented, and policies
attributable to each have become interspersed." 7 The additional presence of an
expectations policy"'S simply bears out the eclectic trend in modern conflicts theory."19
IV. FIGHTING CONFLICTS LOCALISM WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The foregoing interlude on conflicts theory will prove useful as this Article returns to
its main subject, because it will permit important insights about possibilities for
constitutional reform. Attempts to understand the character and reach of constitutional
policies supporting reform will be aided by the realization that these policies are viturally
identical to those animating the substantive, multilateral, or unilateral approaches to
choice of law, or to the concern that chosen law not unreasonably disturb party
expectations.
A. The Limited Authority of the Supremacy Clause to
Regulate Conflicts Localism
The Supremacy Clause' plays a supporting role in all responses to conflicts localism
based on federal law. By establishing the authority of the United States Constitution over
state courts,' it facilitates constitutional regulation of choice of law. By establishing the
authority of nonconstitutional federal law, it facilitates regulation of choice of law by
federal statute,'2 treaty,'2 or common law. 24
The Supremacy Clause is also capable of making a further contribution, one keeping
with the substantive approach to choice of law. Recall that, at the least, the substantive
113. See Richman, supra note 99, at 333.
114. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
115. See Currie, supra note 100, at 177-81.
116. Cf. Sterk, supra note 10, at 955 ("Currie's analysis largely ignored the interests ofprivate parties.").
117. See supra notes 91-92, 105 and accompanying text.
118. Compare the substantive, multilateral, and unilateral conflicts policies of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra
note 60, § 6(2) (quoted supra note 92) with the policy of § 6(2Xd): "Tlhe protection ofjustified expectations."
119. Various descriptions of the trend have appeared. See, e.g., Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap
Between Rules and Approaches in Tort Choice ofLaw in the United States: A Survey of Current Case Law, 27 INr'L LAW.
369 (1993); Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-WateredPlateau, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 10 (1977); Reppy,
supra note 10; Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1989); Symeon C. Symeonides, Revolution
and Counter-Revolution in American Conflicts Law: Is There aMiddle Ground?., 46 OIO ST. L.J. 549 (1985).
One effect of eclecticism is that there are not many purists in the conflicts community. Thus my designation in this
Article of a particular commentator as a unilateralist or as a multilateralist suggests nothing more than the main shape of
his or her arguments.
120. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
121. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMICAN CONSTIUIONAL LAW § 3-4, at 33 (2d ed. 1988).
122. See supra notes 41, 43-44.
123. See supra notes 42-43, 45.
124. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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approach guides choice of law in a way offering no support to conflicts localism., At
the most, it.eradicates conflicts localism. The Supremacy Clause figures prominently in
the second of these functions. It secures safe passage for all forms of federal substantive
law when they encounter conflicting state law. 26
The Tenth Amendment poses some-albeit uncertain-restraint on the power of the
federal government to force its law on states.' 27 It is doubtful, however, that the
obligation to choose federal rather than state rules of decision intrudes enough on state
judicial administration to be problematic under the Tenth Amendment. The Supremacy
Clause merely denies to state judges opportunities for conflicts localism that they would
have if choosing instead between forum and sister-state law.'2
A connection between the substantive approach to choice of law and the Supremacy
Clause exists, and noting it provides a certain symmetry with the more extensive
discussion to follow about the connections the Constitution has with conflicts concerns
of multilateralism, unilateralism, and party expectations. Yet the Supremacy Clause
hardly resonates with conflicts policy. Instead, like that form of the substantive approach
to which it is tied, the Supremacy Clause provides a means of obviating (rather than
regulating) conflicts localism.
Moreover, while affinity between the substantive approach and the Supremacy Clause
suggests an additional role for the latter in regulating conflicts localism, it is still a role
dependent on nonconstitutional lawmaking initiatives. We cannot enlarge the meaning
of the Supremacy Clause to fight conflicts localism since that clause alone secures no
rights to sovereigns or to litigants in the choice-of-law process. The Supremacy Clause
merely gives life to law that Congress, the executive branch, or the judiciary chooses to
make in its discretion.
B. Conflicts Theory as Constitutional Law
Most of the policies associated with the other three conflicts approaches we examined
can be enlisted in a constitutional offensive against conflicts localism. Perhaps only two
policies, comity (a somewhat discarded policy of multilateralism) and the explicit and
overriding preference for forum law (a fringe policy of unilateralism3 0), need be left
behind. The latter obviously will not work because it is friendly to conflicts localism. In
contrast, the multilateralist policy of comity is offended by conflicts localism.'' It seems
125. See supra note 74-76 and accompanying text. Substantive theory can be corrupted to support conflicts localism.
This appears to have happened in Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070
(1980). Correctly understood, however, a substantive approach might lead to selection of either forum or nonforum law.
See Leflar, supra note 76, at 298-300. "A court sufficiently aware of the relation between law and societal needs to
recognize superiority of one rule over another will seldom be restrained in its choice by the fact that the outmoded rule
happens still to prevail in its own state." Id. at 300.
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127. See ROTUNDA &NOWAK, supra note 42, § 4.10 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
128. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1947).
129. See supra note 81.
130. See supra note 101.
131. It may even have figured in a few cases decided by the Supreme Court many years ago that appeared to entertain
the multilateralism of the time as constitutional law. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
Professor Robert Sedler sees ties between Dodge and the Court's more famous, substantive due process decision in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The
Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 64-65 (1981). "[W]ith the passage of time it has
become apparent that Dodge is obsolete." DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 414 (1990).
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difficult, however, to recalibrate comity as a constitutional policy. A vague term, comity
suggests, if anything, a design and level of coordination beyond the boundaries of the
Constitution, or perhaps the constitution of any single nation.1
3 2
When we turn to the numerous conflicts policies that are capable of a second life under
the Constitution, the policy that chosen law not disturb the reasonable expectations of a
party seems a natural choice. Indeed, concern over unfair surprise of a party supported
in part the only restrictive ruling on state choice of law the Supreme Court has made in
recent years.'33
Similarly, it follows that any strains of multilateralist conflicts policy echoed in the
Constitution provide a basis for constitutional regulation of conflicts localism. Localism
is an anathema to multilateralism in theory and usually in fact. 34 Had the influence of
multilateralism in this country not been weakened by inward decay 3 ' and by the
unilateralist challenge of interest analysis,'36 conflicts localism would be far less of a
problem.
Of the three, unilateralism might appear the least likely source of inspiration for
regulating conflicts localism. Granted, unilateralism is little concerned with party
fairness.3 7 Yet once we purge from interest analysis the rule requiring courts to apply the
law of a truly interested forum, 3 interest analysis can be an effective instrument for
protecting nonforum sovereigns from discrimination. The Supreme Court actually toyed
with this as a constitutional rule before eventually abandoning the idea. 39
132. See Herzog, supra note 16; C.G.J. Morse, Choice of Law in Tori: A Comparative Survey, 32 AM. J. COMP. L.
51(1984).
133. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
134. However, even multilateralists refused to follow a rule requiring nonforum law when the pull of conflicting local
law was strong enough. For example, the ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 612, provided: "No action can be
maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy
of the forum" On the public policy exception generally, see John B. Cor, Modem Choice of Law andPublic Policy: The
Emperor Has the Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MtAMI L. REV. 647 (1985).
135. Thus, while the public policy exception to the original Restatement (described supra note 134) was to have
"extremely limited" effect, ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 612 cmt. c, courts made much greater use of it.
On abuse of the public policy exception, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, supra note 86, at 736; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael
1. Sovem, "Public Policy" in Conflict of Laws, 56 COLuM. L. REV. 969 (1956). And courts undermined the prevailing
multilateral approach by using escape devices in addition to public policy. See Walter Cook, "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ. 333 (1933); Joseph Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance,
49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
136. See supra notes 99-100.
137. See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
138. There is debate whether interest analysis is viable as a neutral choice-of-law approach. See supra note 101 (citing
opposing views). However, the position that interest analysis can work for both forum and nonforum law in a neutral
choice-of-law approach-a position taken twice by the American Law Institute, see supra note 101, and never really
renounced by the Supreme Court, see infra note 14041, is defensible, and it provides a useful working assumption for
this Article.
139. The standard is most often associated with Alaska Packers As'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.S.
532 (1935).
[O]nly if it appears that, in the conflict of interests which have found expression in the conflicting
statutes, the interest of Alaska is superior to that of California, is there rational basis for denying to the
courts of Califor ia the right to apply the laws oftheir own state .... The interest of Alaska is not shown
superior to that of California.
Id at 549-50. While the Supreme Court affirmed the California court's choice of local law, the Court's constitutional test
suggested a significant measure of protection to nonforur sovereigns.
Four years later, the Supreme Court "jettisoned" the Alaska Packers standard in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). There, the Court "concluded that the California court was free to
apply the law of either of the two interested states, without weighing or balancing their respective interests." VERNON Er
AL.., supranote 131, at 415 (emphasis in original). In many cases since, for example, Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1 (1961) and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Court has made clear that, while the Constitution may require the
forum state to be interested when the forum applies its own law over the conflicting law of an interested sovereign, that
is all.
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C. Approaches to Constitutional Reform: Three Rules
To explore some of the connections possible between different conflicts approaches
and parts of the Constitution, consider a variety of rules the Supreme Court could fashion
to regulate choice of law: (1) a forum cannot apply law disturbing the reasonable
expectations of a party; (2) a forum cannot apply its own law when to do so would
discriminate against another sovereign; and (3) a forum cannot apply law favoring its
own resident when to do so would discriminate against a nonresident.
These rules could be phrased differently. They may not exhaust all possibilities for
constitutional regulation of choice of law. They are not cumulative, and I do not urge that
the Supreme Court adopt any of them. They serve rather to illustrate from different angles
the intimacy between choice-of-law theory and the Constitution, to indicate some of the
differences between what constitutional law governing conflicts is and what it could be,
and to aid our later consideration of whether the Supreme Court belongs on the sidelines.
1. Rule One: A Forum Cannot Apply Law Disturbing the
Reasonable Expectations of a Party
The first rule draws from the conflicts policy of party expectations, recast as
constitutional due process doctrine. Of the three, only the first rule is within hailing
distance of current law. It has ties with the only two Supreme Court cases that restrain
conflicts localism at all: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts"40 and the much older Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick.'4' Dick was a due process case. Shutts was decided under the
current amalgam of due process and full faith and credit law."
The Supreme Court in Shutts based its conclusion that the Kansas courts' choice of
local law violated the Constitution in part on a finding that choice of Kansas law
disturbed the expectations of Phillips Petroleum, the party aggrieved by that choice.'
In the much earlier Dick case, the Supreme Court struck down the Texas courts' attempt
to apply local law upon a finding that the controversy had nothing to do with the State
Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum
State, by analysis of the interests possesed by the States involved, could constitutionally apply to the
decision of the case the law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity.
Richards, 369 U.S. at 15.
Of course, the Supreme Court reviews state and federal diversity conflicts cases as a neutral court. The cases after
Alaska Packers offer little if any support for the idea that the Supreme Court has grown to mistrust interest analysis as a
neutral tool for conflicts review. Indeed, interest analysis continues to be a key ingredient in the modest constraint on
choice of law found today in the Constitution. See infra note 140-41 and accompanying text.
140.472 U.S. 797 (1985). The case is discussed at length in Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of
Law: he Priority of Fairness over Conity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987); James R. Pielemeier, supra note 10, at 1299;
Shreve, supra note 25.
141. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). An excellent discussion of this case appears in WEiNTRAuB, supra note 13, at 521-24.
142. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Shults, would have viewed the case separately under the two clauses. Shulls, 472
U.S. at 824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The contrary approach continues to be the law today. "[Wlith regard to the issue of
whether an adequate nexus exists for application of local law, the due process and full faith and credit limits are identical."
LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 439 (4th ed. 1995).
143. As the Shutts court stated:
Given Kansas' lack of "interest" in claims unrelated to that State, and the substantive conflict with
jurisdictions such as Texas, we conclude that application of Kansas law to every claim in this case is
sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits. When considering fairness in this
context, an important element is the expectation of the parties.... Kansas "may not abrogate the rights
of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them."
Shuts, 472 U.S. at 822 (quoting Dick, 281 U.S. at 410).
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of Texas. While the Dick Court itself did not speak in terms of party expectations, 144 the
Shutts Court gave it that reading.'
4
1
Rule One would clarify and enlarge the scope of expectations protection currently
available. The Supreme Court has explicitly used an expectations standard only once-in
Shutts-to reverse a conflicts case."46 And there the Court encumbered the expectations
principle by linking it to a forum-interest test; that is, the Court limited protection of
reasonable expectations to cases where the forum was uninterested in applying its own
law. ' 47 Rule One uncouples concern for party expectations from interest analysis.
Separation of the two is sound in theory,' 4' and would give greater range to the
expectations standard.1
49
Greater constitutional life for an expectations constraint might have one interesting
effect on conflicts law and another on due process jurisprudence. Rule One could alter
conflicts law by causing the expectations policy in current eclectic theory to trump
policies that might support choice of the other law. 50 Furthermore, Rule One might have
the effect on due process jurisprudence of lessening the current dichotomy between slight
regulation of choice of law and greater regulation of personal jurisdiction.'
2. Rule Two: A Forum Cannot Apply Its Own Law When
To Do So Would Discriminate Against Another Sovereign
Rule Two draws selectively from both multilateralism and unilateralism. Its object, to
protect nonforum sovereigns from conflicts localism, promotes modem-day
multilateralism. 5 2 To use territorialism (jurisdiction-selection)"I as the instrument for
enforcing Rule Two would render the rule simply and entirely multilateral. 1 4 But, to
144. According to Professor Weintraub, "Dick does not seem greatly emancipated from the rigid, territorial
conceptualism" of earlier precedent. WEDTI'AUB, supra note 13, at 522.
145. See generally Shutts, 472 U.S. 797.
146. Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978), afid, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (see supra note 3 and
accompanying text) may have provided the United States Supreme Court with another opportunity. Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice Otis, dissenting in Hague, argued forcefully that Minnesota's choice of its own law worked unfair surprise
on Allstate in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 50-54 (Otis, J., dissenting).
For discussion of the unpersuasive attempts of Justice Brennan for the plurality and Justice Stevens concurring in Hague
to rationalize the expectations problem, see Shreve, supra note 3, at 347-48.
147. Shuts, 472 U.S. at 821-22.
148. Choice-of-law values secured by expectations and interest analysis are in fact entirely different. See Sterk, supra
note 10, at 955; supra notes 99-100; supra text accompanying notes 113-16. That difference is reflected at the
constitutional level by the distinctions between Rule One and Rules Two and Three.
149. Doubtless there are cases where the forum has sufficient connection to the controversy to be interested, but
application of forum law would work an unfair surprise on the party aggrieved by it. See, e.g., Blarney v. Brown, 270
N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980) (noting that forum interested in availing its resident of a
pro-recovery law but that choice unfairly surprised defendant) (discussed supra notes 2, 4 and accompanying text);
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964) (same); Reese, supra note 13, at 1597 (discussing Lilienthal from this
perspective).
150. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
151. "To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for
jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged
than whether." Linda B. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heiter: Endofan Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978); see also Kozyris,
supra note 3, at 892 ("([Bow to decide a case is more important than where to decide it.").
152. See supra note 82. Thus, Professor Aaron Twerski writes of the "assault on sovereignty ... and corresponding
shock to the expectations of the legal system" inflicted by conflicts localism. Twerski, supra note 9, at 162.
153. On the function of a territorialism, orjurisdiction-selection, in the multilateral approach, see supra note 79.
154. See Laycock, upra note 24 (exploring at length the idea of constitution-based territorialism); Twerski, supra
note 9 (arguing for the same). Rule Two as a territorial rule would serve what Laycock terms "[t]he principle of equal
states: States must treat sister states as equal in authority to themselves." Laycock, supra note 24, at 250.
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demonstrate additional possibilities for constitutional regulation of choice of law, this
discussion employs the unilateralist tool of interest analysis"' to administer Rule Two.
The application and scope of Rule Two would therefore be comparable to the
application and scope of the rule the Supreme Court entertained in Alaska Packers."6
That is, it would bar applications of forum law when another sovereign is more interested
in having its conflicting law applied.'17 Rule Two could rest on full faith and credit law"'
insofar as it protected sister states," 9 perhaps on the Due Process Clause as the full faith
and credit surrogate protecting foreign states, 6 and generally on the Commerce
Clause. 6'
Rule Two would work one small and one enormous change on current law. The small
change would be to uncouple interest analysis from a reasonable expectations inquiry.
6 2
The enormous change would be to nationalize choice of law.
Granted, the only choices of forum law that appear to be invalidated by Rule Two are
instances of conflicts localism-those where the forum's interest is demonstrably less
than that of the source of conflicting law. However, uncertainties often encountered in
interest analysis are such that a plausible argument of greater nonforum interest could be
made in a substantial majority of conflicts cases. 63 Most of these cases would survive the
challenge of Rule Two, but only after the laborious process of fact and policy crunching
required by interest analysis. Moreover, Rule Two would force interest analysis on state
jurisdictions that did not employ it in their conflicts law, since all jurisdictions would
155. For a description of interest analysis and the manner in which it animates unilateral choice of law in this country,
see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. On the utility of interest analysis in a neutral approach to choice of law,
see Shreve, supra note 101.
156. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). For analysis of the Alaska Packers
rule, see WEINTRAUB, supra note 13, at 230.
157. For a variation of Rule Two, see the constitutional rule offered in Martin, supra note 13:
The forum may apply its law to the substantive questions of a case whenever (a) the party resisting application of
that law has acted in the forum or derived from the forum relatively direct benefits, or (b) there is some weaker
connection between the defendant and the forum, and the forum's interests are relatively strong compared to
interests of other states that would be disserved by the application of forum law.
Id. at 230. Either formulation of the rule rests on the assumption that the forum needs a good reason for frustrating the
purpose of nonforum law, and will lack that reason if clearly less interested than the nonforum sovereign.
158. Id. at 229.
159. This would close some ofthe distance in current law between the strong combined effect of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), to coerce recognition of sister-state judgments
and the marginal effect of the two on choice of law. Compare Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life
& Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982) (sister-statejudgment must be enforced) with Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979) (sister-state tort law may be disregarded). For discussion of some of the reasons that have been
offered for maintaining two such different standards under full faith and credit law, see Freund, supra note 20, at 1225-26.
For further discussion of the relation between choice of law and the law ofjudgments, see Gene R. Shreve, Judgments
from a Choice of Law Perspective, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 985 (1992); Gene R. Shrove, Preclusion and Federal Choice of
Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209 (1986).
160. At least after Dick, it has been possible to argue that, while foreign states are beyond the language of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and statute, they can get the same protection by recalibrating full faith and credit arguments under
the Due Process Clause. For an evaluation of this argument, see Martin, supra note 13, at 192-94. The appeal of the
argument is that it provides symmetry of protection for sister states and foreign states. For purposes of discussion, I have
listed this constitutional base as one supporting Rule Two, but I do have misgivings about it. It may be preferable to limit
due process as a protection for parties, not sovereigns. See Hay, supra note 20, at 713 (noting that due process protections
should be limited to situations of "overreaching" against "thte individual or his cause of action").
161. Rule Two rests on what could be termed the dormant Commerce Clause, since the clause would operate in the
absence of a federal statute. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 42, §§ 11.1, 11.1 1(b). While the Commerce Clause may
serve as authority for protecting nonresident litigants from conflicts localism, RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 26, §
96, the broad reach of the clause to "national or multistate interests" associated with commerce in the United States,
Horowitz, supra note 24, at 807, is sufficient to support Rule Two.
162. This uncoupling process is similar to that of Rule One, see supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text, but it
begins at the other end (i.e., interest analysis).
163. See supra note 102.
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have to use interest analysis to vet the constitutionality of their conflicts decisions. It may
not go too far to suggest that, like the similar position the Supreme Court briefly
entertained in Alaska Packers, Rule Two would have "the effect of constitutionalizing
virtually every diversity or other two-state case."'"
The great difference between Rule Two and current law is evident from what each
requires of a judge in analyzing nonforum law. Rule Two requires correct conclusions
about the result (position) nonforum law requires on the merits, and whether the interests
to be advanced by that position are implicated by the facts of the case. These become
constitutional points clearly subject to redecision on United States Supreme Court review.
In contrast, the Constitution does not currently require state and federal diversity courts
to employ interest analysis, nor does it make those electing to use interest analysis
accountable for errors. Moreover, the Constitution does not always require these courts
to be correct in determining the effect of nonforum law on the merits.16
3. Rule Three: A Forum Cannot Apply Law Favoring Its
Own Resident When To Do So Would Discriminate
Against a Nonresident
Just as Rule Two could be equipped with either territorialism or interest analysis as its
instrument, so could Rule Three. A good argument can be made for administering Rule
Three via interest analysis: A way of protecting nonresidents from discrimination would
be to permit application of forum law adverse to them only if the forum is interested.'
However, to take a closer look at territorialism as constitutional law, it will be the
instrument of Rule Three instead. It will serve what Professor Laycock has termed "[t]he
principle of equal citizens: States must treat the citizens of sister states equally with their
own."
167
As a territorial directive, Rule Three could be based on the three parts of the
Constitution thought to address state discrimination against nonresidents: the Equal
Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'"
The changes which territorial Rule Three would work on current constitutional law are
as sweeping as those made by an interest-based Rule Two. The premise of territorial
(multilateral) constitutionalism is that state and federal diversity courts must be stopped
at the threshold from engaging in interest analysis because interest analysis invariably
164. VERNON ET AL., supra note 131, at 415. For a more extensive description of this phenomenon and its
consequences, see Weinberg, supra note 25, at 470-78.
165. Even as between sister states, mere error in construing nonform law does not offend the Constitution. Error must
be flagrant.
To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause, it is not enough
that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our cases make plain that the
misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that is clealy established and that has been brought
to the court's attention.
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988).
166. See Shreve, supra note 25, at 72; Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied Overhauling
Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 69 (1988). Other writers demand a significant connection between the
forum and the controversy in order to support application of forum law, but avoid use of interest analysis to work out their
tests. E.g., Kirgis, supra note 13, at 103; Kogan, supra note 140, at 657.
167. Laycock, supra note 24, at 250.
168. Note, however, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not protect corporations or nonresident aliens.
ROTUNDA &NowAY, supra note 42, § 12.7; Gary J. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 380 n.10 (1979).
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results in conflicts localism. 6 Note the unavoidable sweep of constitutional law founded
on this premise. While it is easy to isolate areas for conflicts reform through federal
common law,' it is impossible to similarly fine tune constitutional control through Rule
Three. Once the premise that interest analysis cannot disadvantage nonresidents becomes
a constitutional principle in one setting (say, wrongful death litigation), it will have to
apply in all conflicts settings (torts, contracts, etc.) that run the risk of favoritism of local
law through interest analysis.
Territorialist Rule Three might require for its administration a series of jurisdiction-
selecting subrules reminiscent of the original Restatement,' 71 one for each type of case
where interest analysis might otherwise come into play. 72 In one sense, maintenance of
territorialist Rule Three might not be as labor intensive as interest-based Rule Two.
Territorialism is not supposed to concern itself (as interest analysis does) with the content
of the rules vying for application. A territorialist approach to constitutional regulation
concerns itself only with sources of law. And it takes far less effort to conduct a rule-
directed search for the appropriate law source-whatever the law of that place-than it
does to determine, as we must in Rule Two, how many interested law sources exist and
just how interested they might be."7
V. DOES THE SUPREME COURT BELONG ON THE SIDELINES?
Most writing on choice of law and the Constitution has focused on the reformation of
constitutional doctrine. The three rules, just considered, competing visions of
constitutionalized conflicts law, provide a pretext for adding to that discussion. But we
will not press on in that direction. Our progress to this point in this Article enables us to
view the constitutional reform of conflicts law from the different and somewhat neglected
angle of federal judicial administration.
An implicit assumption often found in discussions about constitutional reform in
choice of law74 is that questions whether, when, or how the Supreme Court could
implement a particular constitutional reform are subordinate to questions about the shape
or coherence of new doctrine. We can sympathize with this outlook. Federal or state
institutions have the discretion to decline requests for nonconstitutional reform of
169. See Laycock, supra note 24, at 274-75.
170. The Supreme Court may use through common law the dormant power that Congress has to make federal conflicts
law. The Supreme Court is as free as Congress would be to limit the conflicts law it makes to only a particular type of case.
See supra note 48 (discussing the possibility of a federal common law of conflicts limited to mass torts).
171. ORIGINAL RESTATEMENT, supra note 79; see supra note 80.
172. Professor Laycock denies this. Laycock, supra note 24, at 322-23.
173. Compare the straightforward approach of territorialism, see supra note 79, with the relative uncertainties of
interest analysis, see supra note 102. However, if state and lower federal courts are unwilling to accept the discipline of
territorial constitutional regulation, problems of judicial administration might materialize comparable to those for an
interest-based approach. Historic judicial resistance to territorialism as conflicts doctrine, see supra note 135, would likely
reappear should territorialism attempt a comeback. "An attempt to return to territorial choice-of-law rules would
undoubtedly invite, on a greatly accelerated basis, the avoidance techniques used in the past .... Russell J. Weintraub,
Methods for Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 133. Proponents
might argue that obedience to territorial conflicts rules would increase if the rules existed as constitutional law. Yet the
past record of state and lower federal courts in complying with Supreme Court precedents is less than reassuring. See
generally James E. Robertson, When the Supreme Court Commands Do the Lower Federal Courts Listen? The Impact
ofRhodes v. Chapman on Correctional Litigation, 7 HAMLINE L. REv. 79 (1984); Michael Wells, The Unimportance of
Precedent in the Law of Federal Courts, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 357 (1990); Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1344 (1990); Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 VA. L. REV. 494 (1974).
174. See supra notes 17-24.
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conflicts localism.1 75 But the Constitution is about rights and authority, and the rhetoric
of constitutional argument for conflicts reform easily can easily become: Any version of
the Constitution at odds with the version pressed is not merely inferior; it is
illegitimate. 76 Yet it would be a mistake to read too much into the special status of
constitutional law. Even if the Justices of the Supreme Court became convinced of the
doctrinal superiority of an alternative reading of the Constitution over current law, it is
possible to imagine two concerns ofjudicial administration that could delay the Court in
acting on that conviction, or lead the Justices never to act.
The first concern is about the priority of matters competing for the attention of the
Court. Here, however, the case for conflicts reform benefits from conclusions reached
earlier in this Article. Conflicts localism and its attendant harms probably pose a serious
problem in fact,'77 and it is a problem likely to continue without constitutional
intervention. 78 It is very difficult, of course, to determine the relative priority of conflicts
localism on a complete list of social, economic, and political problems inviting revision
of constitutional doctrine. However, let us assume that the place of conflicts localism on
such a list would be high enough to satisfy this first concern.
The second concern is over the capacity of the Supreme Court to oversee enforcement
of constitutional reforms. It is far more troublesome and may in fact eliminate the
possibility of extensive Supreme Court intervention in the foreseeable future. We accept
as a basic principle, grounded if necessary in Article III of the United States Constitution,
that the judicial branch is reluctant to make promises it cannot keep. 79 The Supreme
Court would therefore be reluctant to declare new rights under the Constitution to be free
from conflicts localism which, as a practical matter, it could not vindicate. Heretofore,
my apprehensions' and those of a number of other writers' that constitutional reform
of choice of law might pose such difficulties, have tended to be epigrammatic. The study
of the inseparability of choice of law and constitutional policies in this Article and the
illustrations provided by Rules Two' and Three"3 push deeper into the subject of
175. Avenues of nonconstitutional conflicts reform are surveyed supra part II.
176. See Laycock, supra note 24, at 336 ("The choice-of-law revolution has proceeded in disregard of the
Constitution.).
177. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 40-68.
179. See ALExANDERM. BICEL, MHELAsTDANGEoUS BRANCH 115 (1962); Gene R. Shreve, FederalIntindcions
and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 382, 401-05 (1983). Thus the Court has traditionally conserved and
enhanced its power as a general matter by professing to lack power in particular cases.
180. Shreve, supra note 25, at 65 ("How... does the Supreme Court use for its constitutional reviewing doctrine the
predominant norms of the choice-of-law process without slipping headlong into the process itself?").
181. Justice Robert Jackson found "uniformity in choice-of-law" imposed by the Constitution as "a prospect
comforting to none." Jackson, supra note 20, at 26. He saw such difficulty from serious constitutional intervention into
choice of law that he recognized as one option that "we will adopt no rule, permit a good deal of overlapping and
confusion, but interfere now and then, without imparting to the bar any reason by which the one or the other course is
guided or predicted" Id. at 27.
Professor Paul Freund mused "that problems of choice of law have not lent themselves to satisfactory solution as
constitutional questions, and that in their nature they cannot be expected to." Freund, supra note 20, at 1235.
Professor Aaron Twerski wondered whether the Court's reluctance to curb conflicts localism existed "because it did
not believe that any of the analytical tools available for resolving the problem were capable of curbing the excesses in the
numerous choice-of-law approaches in vogue today without creating total havoc in the field." Twerski, supra note 9, at
151-52.
And Professors Arthur von Mehrn and Donald Trautman noted that, despite the need for "significant federal control
over choice of law.., the great difficulties that contemporary choice-of-law methodology encounters in developing
dispositive rules [makes] the conscientious administration of full-scale controls . . . a significant--perhaps an
intolerable-burden on the Supreme Court. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 31, at 38.
182. See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
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conflicts reform and judicial administration; yet they seem to confirm those earlier
apprehensions.
True, Rule One probably could hurdle the difficulties of judicial administration that
this Article has considered. This assumes that cases where even a plausible expectations
argument is possible constitute a far, smaller group than the conflicts cases touched by
Rules Two and Three. 
t 4
Rule One, however, does not do a great deal alone to fight conflicts localism. The
larger picture therefore remains discouraging. Numerous past proposals for significant
but carefully limited constitutional entry into choice of law,"t including my own,'" may
be in fact unworkable because of difficulties of Supreme Court administration. The
subject deserves a good deal more thought and discussion. The conclusion emerging from
this Article may not be inescapable. It may be, however, that there is no stopping place
for significant constitutional reform of conflicts law. It may be impossible for extensive
constitutional and nonconstitutional components to coexist in a stable regime of
American conflicts law.
184. Given the relatively low incidence of expectations issues in conflicts cases, see supra notes 108-10 and
accompanying text, this seems like a reliable assumption.
185. See, e.g., Hay, supranote 20; Kozyris, supra note 3; Reese, supranote 34.
186. Shreve, supra note 25, at 72.
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